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xecutions, specifically public executions: Since Michel
Foucault published Surveillir et punir in 1975, the grim,
grisly, tortured body has taken its place beside Fanny
Hill's rosebud sensual body as opening and aperture for critical
scrutiny. It is difficult not to disapprove. Little Faustuses with forbid
den books, critics flaunt proscribed texts, utter magic words of release
and empowerment, undo the restraints of ages, and "transgress" and
"subvert" by rule and line, clinging to the undulations of the Zeitgeist:
pursuing interesting projets. High-mindededly explored, the morbid
exercises the ingenuity of the symbolic function, so that any
topic—shit, farts, bad breath, belches, or beheadings—^may be situated
ideologically and culturally, marking the variations worked on the
natural, culture's raw material, by culture. If executions have the slight
ly shameful feature that we are not implicated, that we neither suffer
them nor inflict them and do not intend to—unlike shit, farts, bad
breath, and belches, in which we fully, if discreetly, participate—so
much the better. If the suffering of our best friends somehow pleases,
so the suffering of unknown others somehow eases.
Pleasure in vicarious sufferingwas explained by Aristotle (pity and
fear produce catharsis), became normative as the basis of Christianity
(in his wounds and death is the sweemess of eternal life), and began to
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perplex secular critics when enlightenment descended on the west.
How could any reasonable person take pleasure in others' suffering or
death? If "pleasure" is extended to mean "intensified feeling," there is
no one exempt from the pleasures of heightened sensation produced
by others' misery. Certain forms of such feeling are accorded approba
tion ("feeling another's woe"), and others reprobated (carnival at
Tyburn) or glossed as morally dubious. When scenes of suffering are
taken up, they are allegorized for moderns as the passion sequence
allegorizes suffering for Christians. Often taken from history,
literature, or myth (rather than concocted in an individual author's
"diseased" imagination), scenes of suffering are reattached to signifi
cant levels of meaning and systems of explanation—historical accounts
of the evolution of punishment, for example, as in Foucault. The
essays collected here follow the rules; in two cases, literary representa
tions of executions that seem gratuitous to a modern reader are linked
to the performance of acmal executions, restoring the works to their
contexts, grounding their authors' imaginations, and altering the way a
work is read. In the third, pleasure in vicarious suffering is theorized at
last, as Adam Smith provides an account of the formation of the self
through the other that depends in part on a conflicted relationship to
state executions in his time.
These essays address executions, and their representation, in the
hundred years between 1685 and 1785. In this period, the English
headsman hung up his axe, straightened his cord, and took up a
surgeon's knife on the occasions when he had a decapitation to
perform on a dead treasonable body. A few years later, his French
cousin devised an implement, the guillotine, to take the lingering pains
out of hanging by the neck until dead. By 1790 a few radicals, such as
Maximilien Robespierre, had proposed the abolition of capital
punishment tout court, but without success. Once regarded as humani
tarian advances, these shifts in staging Foucault has taught us to regard
principally as more perfect articulations of state power. Even the last
words of criminals served authorities to reinforce power's legitimacy
and affirm the dominant ideology, as J. A. Sharpe has shown in "'Last
Dying Speeches': Religion, Ideology and Public Execution in
Seventeeth-Century England."^

' Past and Present 85 (1985): 107, 144-67.
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Later critics have shifted Foucault's emphasis by reintroducing
carnival and the audience. Purely Foucauldian accounts of the symbolic
effectiveness of executions thus become a twentieth-century fantasy of
absolute power imposed on much more porous eady modern phenom
ena. Thomas Laqueur argues that carnival persistendy undercut the
ability of executions actually to "confirm the majesty, power, and
legitimacy of the law and of the state."^ Peter Linebaugh demurs at
Foucaiilt's making "rtoles of government and society seem all-power
ful."^ For Laqueur, "Capital punishment, like death in war, is the gold
standard of community expression" (355); carnival executions united
the community, the state absenting itself, until the Reform Acts of 1867
and 1872. The state then redefined its relationship to its citizens and in
1868 took control of executions by removing them from public view.
Made private, overseen by the state alone, executions became irrelevant
to constituting the community (354). If Laqueur seems to forget that
without the state his carnivals would not have taken place, Linebaugh
sees that the state's objectives, "terror, majesty, dread and some pity,"
sharply contrasted with the carnival responses of the people, who
treated the tree with "irreverence, humour, and defiance."^ Neither
observes that the difference between his evidence and Sharpe's is
chronologically specific to the later seventeenth century, a revolutionary
period with executions and consequences.
As has often been remarked, sometimes incredulously, the
dominant metaphor for an execution in the seventeenth century was
theatrical. Carefully staged and costumed, executions were played on
scaffolds, required audiences, and the principal actor came to a tragic
end. Always omitted in analyses of this metaphor is one role that
became increasingly important in later seventeenth-century theater: the
critic. Commentary on executions, whether aligned with authority's
intention or skeptical of it, moves the execution from the sovereign's
control into the sphere of public discussion. Any representation opens

^ Thomas Laqueur,"Crowds, Carnival, and the State in English Executions, 1604-1868," in
A. L. Beier, David Cannadine, and James M. Rosenheim, eds.. The First Modem Society
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 307.
' The London Hanged: Crime and Civil Society in the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1992), 3.
* Peter Linebaugh, "The Tybum Riot against the Surgeons," in Douglas Hay et al., Albion's
Fatal Tree (New York: Pantheon Books, 1975), 66.
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a gap between what authority intends and what it achieves that is filled
or occupied by the observing subject who takes up an alternative
position relative to the transaction between authority and victim.
Instead of authority's controlling the discursive field, other voices
enter, and even those explicitly intending to assert ideology faU by
definition to confirm authority's absolute control over events. Their
existence supposes the possibility of dissent. Representations as horrific
as Foucault's account of Damiens or as jolly (and productive of other
images) as Hogarth's Idk Prentice Executed at Tyburn are often taken
unproblematically as transparent signs of carnival escaping authority's
control. Such representations are better seen as embodying in potentia
social criticism. They do not make arguments, but they stir the mix.'
On the scaffold, all Laqueuris, linebaugh's, and Sharpe's
examples of difficult, insubordinate, refractory, uncooperative, insolent,
self-affirming, state-denying prisoners date from after the Restoration,
as the insubordination of cavaliers relative to parliament, and parlia
ment to its king, skidded down the social scale to the common man and
woman, resentful of authority, often inclined to express it, but rarely
recorded in the act. If the Middle Ages saw men fight the executioner
(Thomas Dun, the outlaw, executed piecemeal, in the time of Henry I),'
or the Renaissance saw aged ladies race round the scaffold to elude the
headsman (the Countess of Salisbury in Henry VIIl's golden days), the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries recorded and published the verbal
defiance of the lower orders at scandalizing length. In these transac
tions between audience and execution are marked important, albeit
subtle, shifts in historical consciousness and circumstances, and it is
such transactions that the papers collected here address.
Two essays treat the earlier part of the period. Margaret Reeves
on Aphra Behn and ReginaJanes on Swift trace the trajectory from the
silent avoidance that affirmed an execution's justice through carnival
representations that produce unease, as writers begin to project
discomfort relative to the commonly exercised and unquestioned right
of sovereignty to dismember traitors and criminals. A third essay,
Robert Mitchell on Adam Smith, locates in Smith's account of
"sympathy" an analysis that explains not only the gradual occlusion of

' J. L.Rayner and G.T. Crook, eds., Complete Newgate Calendar (London: Navarre Society,
1926), 1:7.
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executions but also, more importantly, their persistent recrudescence.
Neither Behn, nor Swift, nor Smith proposes any positive criticism of
public executions or decollations. Such activities remained entirely
legitimate exercises of power against which no general, theoretical
arguments had yet been levelled. Yet Behn and Swift represent public
executions so as deliberately to disturb their readers, while Smith
complicates the notion of sympathy so as to make the cement of
human society also its dynamite.
In "History, Fiction, and Political Identity: Heroic Rebellion in
Aphra Behn's Lave-Letters 'between a Nobleman and His Sister and Oroonoko" Margaret Reeves takes up Aphra Behn and the infamous
execution in 1685 that mangled Dryden's beautiful Absalom, the Duke
of Monmouth. Recently, critics have identified Monmouth in Behn's
work not only with Cesario, the antihero of Love-Letters transparently
modelled on the Duke of Monmouth, but also with Oroonoko, who
has usually been regarded as an authentic figure from Behn's life.
Reeves teases out more areas of correspondence and makes more
specific links from Oroonoko to Monmouth than other critics have
done, suggesting at the very least Behn's fascination with heroics of a
certain courtly type and with heroes in a certain romantic mode. Reeves
uses these correspondences to argue a nuanced relationship in Behn to
"heroic rebellion" and its limits.
The most curious asymmetry between Cesario-Monmouth and
Oroonoko is Behn's representation of their deaths, both incurred as
aftermath to a suppressed rebellion. As Reeves observes, Monmouth's
execution is the most infamously botched in English history. Closely
followed by waiting Whigs in Holland, Monmouth's death was
illustrated in multiple versions for that audience, much as Charles I's
death had been represented earlier and Louis XVI's was to be later.
When Behn recounts the end of Cesario, however, she elides the
process of his death. Its horrors disappear, along with the moving
tribute to Monmouth's almost-Angelica, Lady Harriet Wentworth.
Erasing the details, Behn reproduces the silence that accepts this
traditional exercise of power as jufstice. When Oroonoko comes to die,
however, Behn inverts her method. Instead of avoiding representation,
she moves slowly, graphically, explicitly, through the process of
dismemberment. It is true that no blood flows. Even so, critics have
faulted her taste, lamented her violence, and giggled at her excess. As
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Reeves shows, however, Behn did not have to look so far as Surinam
in 1688 to locate tortured, dismembered bodies; the remnants of the
Monmouth rebellion had been mounted by the hundreds. Behn's
account has the force and effect of the accounts of the Damiens'
execution that Foucault deploys at the beginning of Surveillir etpunir.
Such descriptions are meant "to speak for themselves," but they speak
only when someone at last narrates them. Traditionally, the executioner
proceeds "to do his office," and accounts of executions end with a duty
fulfilled. When the details of dying are represented, when the account
delights the cannibal or horrifies the non-cannibalistic viewer, a new
political agenda has positioned itself on stage.
This is not a political agenda easy to articvJate in the absence of
any supporting theory. As J. A. Sharpe showed in "'Last Dying
Speeches': Religion, Ideology and Public Execution in SeventeenthCentury England," public executions occupied a crucial public space as
ceremony, ritual, and ideological control. They also served as occasion
for self-definition in extremis. Often cited but rarely commented,
felons at the end of the seventeenth century began to be considerably
less complaisant relative to authority in the manner of their taking off.
While many continued to make penitential speeches, others became
cocky, self-assertive, defiant, and openly contemptuous of the authori
ties exerting power over them. Once the lower orders began to slip the
leash of ideological control, we should not be surprised if their betters
imitate them.So Regina Janes looks at Jonathan Swift's representations
of severed heads and executions in his miscellaneous writings and
Gulliver's Travels.
In "Jonathan Swift Bounces a Head," Janes addresses the Scriblerian anomaly of severed heads that bounce. Such executions are
represented from the position of a spectator out of sympathy with both
the executioner and the victim. Such satiric representations articulate
otherwise inarticulable resistance to authority and its conventional
power over the subject, both as the possessor of a head and a member
of the state. With no basis in political theory to challenge the magistrate
as executioner, the satirists imitated—and inspired—the carnival folk
whose responses to executions, whether too cheerful, toolarcenous, or
too maudlin, increasingly disturbed and displeased authorities who
expected executions to perform a somber ideological function. Sucking
avray "majesty, dread, and terror," Swift also disrupts the sympathetic
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response, "pity," regarded as appropriate to the moment and service
able to ideology in the figure of the solemnly penitent sufferer. While
Behn's account reproduces the tragic emotions of pity and fear. Swift's
rejects tragic reconciliation and acceptance to preserve an unsatisfying,
unresolved, aggressively minor disturbance.
In "The Violence of Sympathy: Adam Smith on Resentment and
Executions," Robert Mitchell shows Smith performing the theoretical
analysis that Behn and Swift require in order to move beyond their
double-edged gestures relative to executions. In the second half of the
eighteenth century, many of Smith's acquaintance, often members of
Samueljohnson's circle, either attended executions or discussed others'
attending executions (attenders include Boswell, Richardson, Hogarth,
and Reynolds, discussants Burke, Johnson, Smith, Hume, Walpole,
Fielding). Their links to the writers of the 1720s are clear, as when
Hume (quoted in Mitchell) describes present-day scaffold demeanor in
imagery drawn from The Beggar's Opera. What separates this generation
from its predecessors is attention to its own responses, and censure of
others',-in the mirror of execution. Smith's analytic move—the inward
focus on the self and identification with the sufferer—Pleads ultimately
to the occlusion of executions, but Smith also explains the persistence
of executions by the same means.
By the time of Bentham, as in Swift and modern usage, "sympa
thy" or "compassion" is thoroughly feminized and opposed to
masculine "justice" and "punishment." For Bentham, however, the
modern cult of sympathy threatens to undermine justice itself and to
prevent punishments, regarded as repulsive to tender sensibilities.^ By
contrast, modern students have begun to debunk the "sympatheticness" of sympathy, locating in it a paradoxical aggression, curiosity, and
will to power.^ Mitchell reveals Smith doing something simpler, more
interesting, and gender independent. For Smith, "sympathy" is the
imaginative "action at a distance" by which we put ourselves in
another's place—and by putting ourselves in another's place, we
experience not only "concord," but also, potentially, rage, resentment,
fear, horror, lust. As sympathy produces feUow-feeling with, it also
' Elie Haldvy, The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism, trans. Mary Morris (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1955), 69-70,72-73.
' Ann Jessie Van Sant, Eighteenth-Century Sensibilityand the Novel (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1993).
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produces fellow-feelingagainst. Where thelines of concord arestrongly
drawn, so are the lines of exclusion, leaving out and vulnerable to
attack those not comprehended in the circle of sympathy, the "litde
platoon," in Burke's martial phrase. Sympathy itself creates occasions
and objects of violence.
What then of executions? Surely the spectators who sympathize
with the sufferer should rise up against the executioner on behalf of the
sufferer (as on occasion they did). So too executions like that of
Madame Du Barry in which the unreconciled sufferer screamed and
cried and struggled should be particularly uncomfortable for the
audience, as her execution is reported to have been (fulfilling SirJoshua
Reynolds' prediction, cited in Mitchell). Yet the sufferer in any
execution is presumably someone who has elicited society's resentment
by causing harm to others and who has therefore placed himself
outside the circle of sympathy, like the murderer executed in Gulliver's
Travels. In Mitchell's meticulous account, the tensions among admira
tion, resentment, fear, and pity, aU produced by sympathy, are resolved
in the state-sponsored execution that enacts "justice." Executions
reconcile society and the individual criminal by revenging violations of
the law on the criminal and simultaneously providing sympathy for the
criminal as he is taken off.
Mitchell suggests that Smith's complex account of resentment,
sympathy, and justice in execution is informed by the last great English
decollations—the beheadings of the Scottish lords of the '45, Kilmar
nock and Balmarino in 1746, Lovat in 1747. These were executions of
which few doubted the justice, and even fewer seem to have withheld
sympathy from the sufferers. As a Scot in London during the rebellion.
Smith experienced the knotted sympathy that excludes and threatens
violence against those it excludes. From such experiences, aided by
Hutcheson, Hume, and Rousseau, Smith succeeded in providing an
account of the self that moves beyond Hobbes's self-interest to a self
formed through its interaction with others. His may be the most
unsympathetic account of "sympathy" since Rochefoucauld and
therefore, perhaps, the most useful.
From these accounts of executions, readers wiU rightly conclude
that not very much changed in the English management of statesponsored death in the eighteenth century. The Bloody Code grew
bloodier—and was increasingly debated. Public executions shifted from
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Tybum to Newgate in 1783, but continued to be public in spite of
Henry Fielding's complaints. Even the axe, laid by for beheadings of
live lords after 1747, was picked up again for one already dead common
traitor in 1817 and then laid aside as too clumsy for the next. No
society declared itself dedicated to "Promoting the Abolition of Capital
Punishment" until 1846, though as early as 1809 a group casting doubts
on the topic called itself, shyly, the "Society for the Diffusion of
Knowledge Respecting the Punishment of Death and the Improvement
of Prison Discipline."®
The changes that did occur seem slight, although they signified to
those involved. In the reign of Charles II, a goldsmith lost his
head—but his family were given his body—for muttering in a tavern
that one could do better than the king in the reign of George II, a
pamphlet in favor of the pretender cost a man his head and a disem
boweling. By the reign of George III, shouting "damn the king, let us
cut off his head like the French" did not always earn even a prosecu
tion for seditious words.' Trying to kill the king, firing a gun at him or
going after him with a knife, one was only declared mad and locked up
to outlive the king himself. To be executed for treason,it was necessary
to attack parliament and ministers, rather than the monarch. As Frank
McLynn puts it.Jacobinism replacedJacobitism as the threat feared by
the executing classes."
Following the rules set up at the beginning of this introduction, we
can almost turn an examination of ambiguous representations into a
coverdy whiggish progress report. Of the Ordinary of Newgate's
account of the lives and deaths of his charges, Peter Linebaugh
declares, "Nothing like them has been published before or since.""
Such popular high culture writers as Behn, Pope, Swift, and Gay
produced ironic and moralistic discourses that became political activism
in Thomas Jefferson, Robert Burns, and Tom Paine. Even the Essay on
Man packages political theory in tidy aphorisms capable of revolution
ary as well as reactionary application. The inward turn of philosophical

' David D. Cooper, The Lesson of the Scaffold (Athens, Ohio:Ohio University Press, 1974),
55.
* John Barrel!, Imagining the King's Death: Figurative Treason, Fantasies of Regicide
1793-1796 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2(X)0), 1(X)-102.
Crime and Punishment in Eighteenth-Century England (New York:Routledge, 1989), 156.
" The London Hanged, xix.
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discourse that made "sympathy" a heuristic principle, rather than a
mother's weakness, created difficulties for Bentham. Gender-free
sentiment was an argument, not a vice. These essays, however, suggest
a more complex, dialectical movement, for each eighteenth-century
author suggests a range of possible responses to the execution encoded
in the account itself. Compassion coexists with curiosity, sentiment
with science, sympathy with resentment, and they struggle, one
inextricable from the other, to the death.

